Recent US report: National issue

The semi-annual White House report to the US Congress outlines the progress, or its lack, towards the main objectives of the Afghanistan war as well as US operations against Al-Qaeda in Pakistan. The report divulged to the press represents its declassified parts. However, the contents of the classified segments of the report, withheld from the public view, yet remain of unusual interest. The report to the Congress is presented barely three months before the US President is scheduled to announce the graduated programme for the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.

The report surveys both military and political situations in Pakistan. A deterioration of the situation in FATA during the first quarter of the current year is reported. From among the six out of the total seven tribal agencies, the report in particular pointed out Mohmand and Bajur agencies for the recurrence of insurgent strongholds. The US worked “jointly [with Pakistan] in the last year to disrupt the threat posed by Al-Qaeda.” It acknowledged that the overall “tremendous human sacrifices” were made by Pakistan forces in the region. However, the vexing issue is the lack of any indication of “hold” and “build” planning to complement the ongoing clearing operations.

According to the latest US survey, Pakistan lacks a “robust plan” to defeat the Taliban, and its security forces struggle to hold areas cleared of the Al-Qaeda linked insurgents at a pronounced cost. The report further notes, there remains no clear path toward defeating the insurgency in Pakistan, despite the sustained deployment of almost a 150,000 forces.

As the report seems to lament the “deterioration of the situation” in FATA and Islamabad lacking a “robust plan” to overcome the “Taliban” challenge, therefore it is appropriate that the history of insurgency in the southwest Asian region is to be kept in perspective. The military invasion of Afghanistan during 1979 and its occupation by the former USSR served as the initial cause for the beginning, growth and continuity of the militant insurgency in the area. The US, as the archrival of then USSR in the Cold War era, rendered its unrestricted help in the organisation of Islamic insurgency throughout the Islamic world, against the military occupation of Afghanistan by the USSR. However, after the withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan during 1989, the tradition of militancy took hold in this region and beyond - in the Gulf States and the Middle East - in both militant activity and organisational structure, inclusive of Al-Qaeda.

In the aftermath of 9/11 incidents, the US launched a military invasion against Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Aided by President Musharraf’s regime, the US realised its three declared war objectives in Afghanistan - namely, dismantling of militant training camps, arrest or elimination of Al-Qaeda leadership, and change of the Taliban regime - by the end of 2001. Adopting a policy of military expansionism - annual US defence expenditure almost equals that of the remaining world - and ignoring to its peril the lesson from the USSR invasion during the 80s, the US ended up enacting the role of a foreign military occupation force in Afghanistan. The aftermath, of course, was predictable, for throughout their proud history Afghans have invariably defended their freedom from any foreign military occupation.