A lot of conjecture surrounds discussion of what some consider an impending North Waziristan operation. A policy-based analysis of the situation, bearing in mind our national interests, may prove instrumental in both separating fact from fiction, and in helping to clarify a reasonable course of action:
1. Although the military has denied that an operation is ‘imminent,’ by the looks of it we are being dragged willy-nilly into waging war on those using sanctuaries in North Waziristan, including the Haqqani Taliban. Initial resistance against such an operation has been overcome although no one is willing to admit it as yet. Of course, the exact dimensions and timings are not clear but there is little doubt that an operation is now inevitable.
2. Ironically, it was OBL who made sure of that by holing out in Abbottabad right under our noses. His undetected presence in Abbottabad was exploited by Hillary and Mullen to pile on the pressure. Hillary reportedly demanded action or else the US would act unilaterally. Once again when confronted with the “do it or else” ultimatum, we have keeled over – despite the plethora of denials.
3. When the operation is eventually launched all sorts of explanations will be offered. Some are already being trotted out to prepare the country for the impending war. We are told, for instance, that we had always allowed for such an eventuality at a time of our choosing and hence it is hardly unexpected. Another is that our target is Hakimullah Mehsud and therefore by implication, not the Haqqani Taliban. One khaki confided that it will be a ‘limited operation’. Mr Gilani added his mite saying there is no such thing as a ‘good’ Taliban or a ‘bad’ Taliban implying that as we are already fighting the Pakistani version we may as well fight the original Afghan brand too since they couldn’t be any different. A sentiment probably prompted by the tongue lashing he must have received from Hillary. None of the above sounds compelling. Hence, even at this late hour before rushing in where even angels fear to tread, our leaders should pause to reflect.
4. The Haqqani Taliban are waging war against an American-led occupation force from what is technically Pakistani soil but is for all practical purposes their traditional homeland; and to which they have had unimpeded access since time immemorial. Neither they nor their Afghan countrymen, nor even the tribes on our side, have ever recognised the Durand Line as the territorial divide between Pakistan and Afghanistan; nor has Islamabad taken more than cosmetic steps to ensure that they do. Hence for them, as well as the local inhabitants, an attack on North Waziristan by Pakistan is akin to that by a foreign invader which they are honour-bound to resist.
5. Such a war would mean that yet more tribes, and a larger segment of our Pashtuns, would end up fighting against the army. In due course, as the fighting spreads, lives are lost, people displaced and properties ruined, an ever increasing number will become disenchanted and this could have lethal consequences for the unity of the country. Of course, eventually, the Americans will recognise their folly and leave Afghanistan, much as they did in the case of Vietnam but by then it may be too late for us. A generational war pitting the tribes against the federation would have started and Pakistan’s very survival placed in jeopardy.
6. We need, therefore, to put the impending military action in perspective. There are two wars going on, one against Pakistan by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the other in Afghanistan by the ousted Afghan Taliban. There is some overlap between the two but mainly because of Al-Qaeda which is pursuing its own designs. Regardless, the distinction between the two must still be maintained. The first concerns Pakistan; the second much less so.
Moreover, while cooperation with America is a lot easier against Al-Qaeda et al, against the Afghan Taliban, it is less straightforward. The Afghan Taliban are only interested in Afghanistan, unlike Al-Qaeda. True, we have an obligation to help the Americans fight Al-Qaeda and its affiliates of which the Afghan Taliban are manifestly not, or else, presumably, the Americans would not be talking to them, much less asking them to share power with Karzai in an eventual peace deal. We have by and large met our obligations concerning the elimination of Al-Qaeda and even the Americans concede that we have acquitted ourselves well although in the process we have absorbed enormous damage.
7. In a sense we have no option. No state can permit its territory to be used as a launching pad for attacks against another. However, the state has a higher obligation to itself which is to seek a solution by peaceful means and, in this particular case, through an Afghan owned and Afghan-led peace process. And this becomes mandatory when what is at stake is the country’s future stability and progress. It is a folly for Pakistan to provoke the unremitting hostility of the Afghan Taliban with whom it must coexist and to do that merely to appease the Americans in their pursuit of an evanescent military triumph.
8. It is the peace process therefore, that should be uppermost in our minds right now. Military actions should at best play a tactical, subservient role to the peace process. We should have indicated far more forcefully that we want reconciliation between the Afghan Taliban and their adversaries and are willing to use our influence to that end. We haven’t said as much. And given our ties with the Afghan Taliban and suspicions that we want the Taliban back in power, we need to do more to persuade others of our peaceful intentions. It doesn’t make sense to talk of peace on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis. There has to be more flexibility on all sides if the outcome is to be meaningful and enduring.
9. Perhaps, the best way would be to become active in some capitals (Kabul, Ankara, Riyadh, Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, Paris, London and Washington DC) about pursuing a fresh initiative that focuses on accelerating the Afghan peace process so that the Afghan Taliban can be accommodated on the basis of reconciliation. If need be we should have our initiative endorsed by the OIC only for technical and diplomatic purposes so that we have a multilateral document to work with and for others to take our initiative more seriously. More than any other country, we are in the thick of it. And yet our policy makers are inert and lifeless. Worse, they are coming in the way of directing our energy on the home front towards the TTP et al.
10. If the Americans insist on taking on the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan by bombing and invading the tribal areas then there isn’t much we can do to prevent them without inviting our own destruction. Furthermore, the Americans will get bogged down soon enough and realise what we have for centuries, that Afghanistan is a snake pit and no one who has put his hand in it has emerged unscathed. Besides, nothing that the Americans conjure up by way of a militarily strategy will prove effective. Neither carpet bombing the lunar-like landscape nor night raids by Special Forces. Bombing villages and killing innocent civilians will only earn America more odium. The Russians killed over a million Afghans in their decade long sojourn in Afghanistan but to no effect. We should not, therefore, succumb to the emotive element that’s driving current American policy in Af-Pak. This policy is at cross purposes with our own.
11. Instead, we should turn our attention to dealing with the extremists in mainland Pakistan where terrorism has its roots. In other words, we should be gearing up to break the back of Al-Qaeda-led TTP elements in our heartland rather than get diverted into an operation in North Waziristan which we can ill afford and that may well prove ruinous.
The writer is a former ambassador. Email: charles123it@hotmail.com
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