No invincible position

THE conventional wisdom on the Pakistan-US relationship has been that neither side can do without the other at this point.
Pakistan certainly believes — this has been my view as well — that it is too important to be cut loose.
While true, this type of analysis assumes that the respective, pro-engagement leaderships will continue dictating the relationship and retain their veto over voices that seek a revision. To be sure, this is no longer a certainty.
In Pakistan, Washington’s policymaking is often seen as well-organised and meticulously executed. Whatever decisions any US government entity takes are believed to be thought through and deliberate. Implicit then is the belief that since Pakistan remains critical to US interests, Washington will never force the relationship to the tipping point.
Washington, however, is far from a monolith. If anything, decision-making in the US capital is a result of a process that is often incoherent and competitive among the various branches of government. In true democratic fashion, everyone gets a say, all major policymaking entities project their own views, vested institutional interests and personal agendas are very much part of the mix and while the president is the final voice, he is far more constrained than most Pakistanis imagine.
If one were to distil the various views and policy options being proposed for Pakistan in Washington at the moment, the
conclusion would have to be a pessimistic one: while no one wants a rupture, the pro-engagement voices are nonetheless under increasing pressure; the mainstream narrative sees Pakistan as a less-than-sincere partner in the counterterrorism effort; Islamabad’s reluctance to clear Afghan insurgents from Fata is seen as the major obstacle in taming the Taliban opposition; no one believes that Pakistan has made a clean break from its policy of supporting militancy; there is not much sympathy for Pakistan’s outlook vis-à-vis India; US monetary assistance is not seen as having delivered adequate returns; lack of accountability in aid utilisation concerns many; and the anti-US sentiment, often seen as being promoted by the state itself, irks most.
I do not wish to examine whether these perceptions are justified. The bottom line is that these perceptions exist — and perceptions, in this case, are more important than reality. The outcome: the mainstream narrative on Pakistan is acutely negative; patience is wearing thin among many quarters.
Looking ahead, certain actions are being projected as increasingly probable:
The US Congress, concerned as it is about the weak economic situation at home and predicted to become even more so especially if the Senate changes hands in favour of the Republican party next year, is taking a tough stance on foreign assistance in general. On Pakistan, many in the Congress remain unconvinced that American taxpayers’ money is getting its worth in return or that it is being spent in the right manner. There is hardly any appetite left for unconditional aid without returns.
While an aid cut-off is not on the cards, Congress is all but certain to demand greater accountability of the aid flowing into Pakistan. Moreover, unless military-to-military ties improve drastically or Pakistan overhauls its current outlook towards Afghanistan in line with the American strategy, security assistance may face greater deliverable-based conditionalities.
In terms of counterterrorism, the US military surge will concentrate on eastern Afghanistan next year as the Pentagon tries to break the back of the Haqqani network. Given the belief that elimination of sanctuaries in Pakistan is necessary to achieve this goal, Islamabad is likely to face even greater pressure to ‘do more’. Failing this, the US will have to bank on drone strikes more heavily; by implication, the need for ground-based intelligence would be greater as well.
Finally, while Pakistan’s importance in the reconciliation phase in Afghanistan cannot be overlooked, if the above comes to pass, there will be even less willingness to allow Pakistan too major a role in the endgame in Afghanistan. There will certainly be few advocating a favourable view of Pakistan’s concerns, especially those that do not suit the US or its other allies in the region.
All this would have taken place even if some key voices in Washington oppose it. The aid relationship will be determined by Congress, not by the Obama White House. The sanctuaries’ issue will be pushed as part of the already-agreed military strategy in Afghanistan; no one would want to take the blame for reversing this pressure on Pakistan (of course, not many see any reason to do so). Let us also not underestimate the power of the narrative: 2012 is election year in the US and reinforcing the mainstream, popular views on this issue will be much easier than to take a more conciliatory line on Pakistan.
The point here is not to suggest that bilateral ties are necessarily headed for disaster. It is simply to point to the fallacy of believing that Pakistan’s criticality for Afghanistan’s ‘endgame’ makes its position invincible. The mood in Washington is fast changing and may set into a motion a series of measures that alter the nature of the relationship drastically — to Pakistan’s dislike.
Of course, the reaction to such developments in Pakistan will makes matters worse. Demands for greater aid conditionalities and accountability have never been seen as an instrumental issue in Pakistan; it has always been viewed as part of the arm-twisting and bullying tactics applied by Washington. A move in this direction will inevitably play into the scepticism about the utility of US aid and the anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. The reactions to the ‘do more’ message and the other,
inevitably harsh signals that would flow from Washington in such a scenario would be equally negative. Indeed, judging by the present mood, the street may well call for total disengagement.
If ruptured US-Pakistan ties are as detrimental as most believe, then the above is a recipe for disaster. There is therefore an urgent need for both sides to understand the dynamics in each other’s capital better. There is no substitute for an open and frank discussion about their interests, apprehensions, limitations, and intentions. The leaderships also need to have more realistic expectations and convey the same to quarters that are most likely to force an unintended rupture. They also need to challenge the acutely negative perceptions of the other side in their respective countries.
The writer is South Asia adviser at the US Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.

Source: Dawn News